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Carter v. Lee
283 F.3d 240 (4th Cir. 2002)
L Facs
On March 9, 1992, Mrs. Helen Purdy (Purdy") was stabbed thirteen times
and found dead in a pool of blood on her living room floor. Purdy's purse was
found open on her bed and fifteen dollars that Purdy placed by the telephone
were missing. On April 6,1992, Desmond Keith Carter ("Carter") was indicted
for the death of Purdy, his next-door neighbor. On February 1, 1993, Carter was
indicted for the robbery of Purdy with a dangerous weapon.'
In 1993, Carter was convicted bythe Superior Court of Rockingham County
for the first-degree murder of Purdy. He was also sentenced on a charge of
robbery with a dangerous weapon. The jury unanimously recommended the
death penaltyand the judge sentenced Carterto death. Carter was also sentenced
to forty years in prison for the robbery.2
Carter appealed to the Supreme Court of North Carolina; the court affirmed
his convictions and sentences.3 The United States Supreme Court denied Carter's petition for certiorari.4 Carter, asserting five claims of error, filed a Motion
for Appropriate Relief("MAR") seeking post-conviction
relief in the Superior
Court of Rockingham County ("PCR Court").5 The PCR Court denied four of
Carter's five claims and conducted an evidentiary hearing on the remaining
claim- whether the advice given to Carter byhis attorneys, that he should testify
in his own defense during the guilt phase of his trial, was constitutionally defective.6 The PCR Court found that both of Carter's attorneys met with him and
spoke with him on many occasions about a possible diminished capacitydefense
premised on Carter's consumption of alcohol and drugs prior to the murder.'
The court also noted that Carter's lawyer, Thomas E. Medlin, Jr. (Medlin"),
consulted the Death Penalty Resource Center and that both attorneys hired a
1.

Carter v. Lee, 283 F.3d 240,242-46 (4th ar. 2002).

2.

Idat243.

3. Id
4.
Id at 240; see also Carter v. North Carolina, 517 U.S. 1225 (19%) (mem.) (denying writ
of certiorari.
5.
Ca7', 283 F.3d at 243 n.3. In North Carolina, anyattempt to obtain relief from criminal
trial errors is a MAR Therefore, a MAR is not exactly the same as a habeas corpus petition. See
pm~yN.C GEN. STAT. S15A- 1401 (2001) (allowing a capital defendant in North Carolina to seek
post-conviction relief through MAR).
6. Cara, 283 F.3d at 244.
7. Id at 250.

CAPITAL DEFENSEJOURNAL

[Vol. 15:1

psychologist, Dr. John Warren ("Warren"), to examine Carter's mental status.8
The attorneys also advised Carter that he would be cross-examined about his
drug activities and they videotaped amock cross-examination to prepare him.'
The court determined that Carter was advised about the strategy and never
objected.'0 Carter conceded that the decision to testify in the trial's guilt phase
was his12 alone." The PCR Court denied Carter's ineffective assistance of counsel
claim.

Carter sought review from the Supreme Court of North Carolina for the
PCR Court's denial and was denied his request for certiorari." Carter did not
seek review bythe United States Supreme Court. Carter requested federal habeas
corpus relief, based on the ineffective assistance claim, from the United States
District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina. In response, the State
moved for summaryjudgment."4 The district court granted summary judgment
and declined to issue Carter a certificate of appealability. Carter then sought
issuance of a certificate of appealability and an award of habeas6 corpus relief
from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Crcuit.'
Carter raised a single issue at the habeas proceeding: that he was denied his
Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel in his 1993 North
Carolina state court trial when his attorney advised him to testify in his own
defense during the guilt phase of the trial.'" In support of this claim, Carter
asserted two different errors: (1)counsel failed to explain to him the disadvantages of testifying in his own defense; and (2) his attorneys gave flawed advice
that forced him to testify in breach of his privilege against self-incrimination.'"
I1. Hdd g

The Fourth Circuit held that Carter was not entitled to habeas corpus relief
and declined to issue a certificate of appealability. The standard for issuance of
a certificate of appealability is when "the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. "' The Fourth Circuit concluded that
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Id
ld at 251.
Id at 251 nS.
Id at 251.
Ganr, 283 F3d at 252.
Id at 244.

14.

Id

15.
16.

Id
Id
Id at 249. Sw SavaUy US. CDIT. amend. VI (guaranteeing right to the effective

17.
assistance of counsel.
18. Cane, 283 F.3d at 249.
19. Id at 253.

20.

Id at 244 n.6 (quoting 28 U.S.C S 2253(c)(2) (2000)).
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Carter could not make a "substantial showing" that his counsel had been ineffective within the meaning of Sridkvaiv Wabisr" 2 '
IIL A mbsis
Under Stuideargin order to prevail on an ineffective counsel claim, a twopronged test must be satisfiedY2 The first requirement isthat the defendant must
demonstrate that counsel's performance was lacking to such a degree that
counsel was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed to the defendant by the
Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must showthat the deficient performance by counsel prejudiced the defense.24
A. Explanmz qfdeDisadumrac'Tto5ig
Carter first relied on d.amsn v Bakkdui to argue that his counsel's advice
was unreasonable because there were conflicts between Carter's testimony and
other evidence in the case? Carter's conflicting testimonyspecificallyinduded
contradictory admissions and claims concerning his actions in connection with
the death of Purdy." The Fourth Circuit found that Carter's reliance on Balduin
was misplaced?8 The court noted that unlike Bad;n, there was substantial
evidence against Carter and that his attorneys conducted an adequate investigation.29 30Further, unlike Bakldtn there was no showing that Carter perjured
himself.

The Fourth Circuit evaluated Carter's first contention that his lawyers,
Medlin and Douglas K Hux ("HiC"), did not appraise him of the advantages and
disadvantages of testifying.31 The court relied on the findings of the PCR Court,
which found that Medlin considered the advantages and disadvantages of presenting the diminished capacity argument through Warren's and Carter's testimony.2' The Fourth Circuit observed that throughout the course of the trial,
21. Id at 248; swStrickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.668 (1984) (holding that defendant must
show counsel's deficient performance and that his performance prejudiced the defense before a
sentence
22.
23.
24.

or conviction will be ovemuned).
Sti&lzan 466 US. at 687.
Id
Id

25. 114 F.3d 835 (9th Cr. 1997).
mer,283 F.3d at 251-52 n.9; swJohnson v. Baldwin, 114 F.3d 835,840 (9th Cir. 1997)
26.
(holding that attorney's failure to investigate defendant's denial of presence at scene of crime is
ineffective assistance of counsel).
27.
28.
29.

Canr,283 F.3d at 250.
Id at 251-52 n.9.
Id

30.

Id

31.
32.

Idat 252.
Id at 250.
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Medlin and Hux consulted with Carter about his conflicting statements and the
attorneys believed that testifying would repair Carter's credibility." The Fourth
arcuit, relying on this evidence, stated that Carter was unable to show that the
PCR court's findings were erroneous.34
Because the advice given to Carter, concerning whether he should testify,
was necessary, the Fourth Circuit relied on UnitedState v Tazge" to determine
that Carter's counsel was not constitutionally deficient.36 Rather, the Fourth
Carcuit found that the attorneys' performance was based on sound strategy and
fell within the boundaries of reasonable professional norms. 7 With regard to
Carter's request for a new sentencing hearing, the court observed that Carter
must show that had he not testified, the jury would not have recommended a
jurywould have recommended the
death sentence." The court asserted that the
39
death sentence absent Carter's testimony.
B ForadTsmny
Carter also asserted that his lawyer's advice "forced himto testifyagainst his
will."' He based this contention on Hux's allegedly mistaken belief that Carter
"had to testify in order to establish the foundation for a diminished capacity
defense."4 ' Carter contended that neither of his lawyers notified him that his
testimony was not legally necessary; therefore, the advice was constitutionally
defective.42 Carter asserted that if he had been advised that his testimonywas not
legally necessary, he would not have taken the stand."3
In reviewing Carter's claim, the Fourth Circuit examined whether counsel's
performance was reasonable under established professional norms and according
to the circumstances of this case.' The Fourth Circuit, relying on Striarai
observed that "the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the

33.
Cmer, 283 F.3d at 250.
34. Id at 251.
35. 953 F.2d 1525 (11th Cr. 1992).
36. Cme, 283 F.3d at 252; sm United States v. Teague, 953 F2d 1525,1533 (11th Ar. 1992)
(proposing that when counsel has come to a conclusion whether his client should testify,he should
advise his client "in the strongest possible terms").
37. Qnfr, 283 F.3d at 252.
38. Id at 252 n. 10 (citing Jones v. Murray, 947 F2d 1106, 1115 (4th Cr. 1991) (stating that
a defendant must show a reasonable probability that the jurywould not have imposed death if the
defendant testified)).
39. Id
40. Idat 252.

41.

Id

42. Id; US. CONST. amend. V (stating, "No person... shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself").
43. CGatw, 283 F.3d at 253.
44. Id at 249.
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circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy."4"
The Fourth Cwrcuit found that Medlin did understand that Carter's testimonywas
not legally necessary, but that it was necessary to the success of the diminished
capacity defense.' Additionally, the court found that Carter was aware that he
was not required to testify and that he had "no strong feelings" about whether
to testify.47 The Fourth Crcuit concluded that Carter's lawyers did not force him
to desert any of his principles.4" The court also asserted that Carter was unable
to demonstrate prejudice, required by the second prong of the Stridland
analysis.049 Therefore, the Fourth Circuit declined to issue a certificate of appealability."

IV. Appliatim i V

za

As the Fourth Circuit has shown, the presumption that an attorneys
performance is strategically sound and falls within the bounds of reasonable
professional norms is strong. According to the Fourth Circuit, Carter's attorneys
properly advised their client to testify during the guilt phase of his trial.5 ' This
case is a good model for attorneys who are considering whether to advise their
client to give guilt or sentencing phase testimony. Capital defense attorneys
should discuss thoroughly with the defendant the issue of testifying. Additionally, attorneys should consult death penalty resources and, if necessary, hire a
psychologist to evaluate the defendant's mental status. The Fourth Carcuit, in
Care, found that these measures were reasonable within professional norms. 2

In deciding this case, the Fourth Circuit relied, in part, on UniteStaeS v Tagu,
and noted that advice given to capital defendants about testifying should be "in
the strongest possible terms."5 3 Practitioners should make a concerted effort to
educate capital defendants clearlyon the necessity of the client's testimonyto the

success of the defense. The Fourth Circuit, using this case as an example,
continues to apply the Stridkarndteststrictly's
45.

Id

46.
47.

Id at 253.
Id at 253 n12.

48.

Id at 253.

49.
50.

Carte, 283 F.3d at 253.

51.

Id
Id

52.

Id

Id; Tezgw, 953 F2d at 1533.
SeeMckens v. Taylor, 122 S. C. 1237, 1245 (2002) (affirming Fourth Grcuit ruling that
Stidclard standard is not met when defendant failed to show that conflict of interest adversely
affected counsel's performance); Wiggins v. Corcoran, 288 F.3d 629, 641 (4th ar. 2002) (stating
that defense counsel's failure to disclose petitioner's bad childhood and low mental capacity was a
reasonable, strategic choice); Hunt v. Lee, 291 F.3d 284, 293 (4th Car. 2002) (maintaining that
defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim, based on defense counsel's dosing argument
concerning the "barbaric nature" of the death penalty, did not support habeas relief).
53.
54.
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V. Ccerwiom

The Fourth Circuit, relying on the findings of the PCR Court, denied
Carter's appeal and rejected his request for a certificate of appealability" The
Fourth Circuit found that Carter's attorneys educated him about the advantages
and disadvantages of testifying and did not coerce his testimony's Therefore, the
court held that Carter did not satisfyStrkavzfs two-pronged testy The advice
given to Carter to testifyin the guilt phase of his trial was deemed bythe Fourth
Circuit as acceptable trial strategy"
Priya Nath

55.
56.
57.
58.

QG f, 283 F.3d at 253.
Id at 252.
Id at 253; see Sti&ln 466 US. at 687.
Qnff, 283 F.3d at 252.

